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On 1 January 1995, the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settle-
ment of Disputes (DSU) entered into force. During its first ten years, the DSU has since
been applied to 324 complaints – more cases than dispute settlement under the GATT
1947 had dealt with in nearly five decades. The system is perceived, both by practition-
ers and in academic literature, to work generally well. However, it has also revealed some
flaws. Negotiations to review and reform the DSU have been taking place since 1997
(“DSU review”), however, without yielding any result so far. In the meantime, WTO
Members and adjudicating bodies managed to develop the system further through
evolving practice. While this approach may remedy some practical shortcomings of the
DSU text, the more profound imbalance between relatively efficient judicial decision-
making in the WTO (as incorporated in the DSU) and nearly blocked political decision-
making evolves into a serious challenge to the sustainability of the system. This article
provides an overview of the first ten years of DSU practice, the on-going DSU review
negotiations, and the challenges to the dispute settlement system.
Keywords: WTO, Dispute Settlement, DSU Review Negotiations
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1 Introduction
Trade agreements on the basis of reciprocity are instruments used by gov-
ernments to achieve trade liberalisation.The reciprocal exchange of mar-
ket access rights which occurs through such agreements amounts to an in-
ternational exchange of domestic political support between governments
that helps policymakers to overcome the protectionist bias of uncoordi-
nated trade policies. In order to protect the negotiated balance of rights
and obligations from eroding – i.e.by trade restrictions which one govern-
ment may introduce in violation of the trade agreement in order to en-
hance its political support from import-competing interests – trade agree-
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-thomas.de.ments usually include dispute settlement mechanisms based on diplo-
matic and/or adjudicative procedures.
Such a dispute settlement mechanism is also included in the multilateral
trading system. Based on the rudimentary provisions of two articles in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947, i.e.Article XXII
on Consultations and Article XXIII on Nullification or Impairment of
Benefits, dispute settlement developed gradually through evolving prac-
tice and occasional codifications thereof.With the exception of an anti-
legalist phase in the 1960s, the trend went from an initially diplomacy-ori-
ented mechanism towards a more adjudication-oriented one.
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
brought the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 1
January 1995.According to Article III.3 of the WTO Agreement, dispute
settlement is one of the key functions of the WTO.The rules of the mech-
anism are laid down in detail in the Understanding on Rules and Proce-
dures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (in short:Dispute Settlement
Understanding; DSU) in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement.The DSU has
both incorporated the inherited concept of GATT dispute settlement,and
it has codified the practices that had evolved previously into a consoli-
dated text.In addition,it has brought important innovations (see below).
The mechanism has been used actively by Members in the first ten years
of its existence.At the same time,it has been a topic of much academic in-
terest and debate. Moreover, Members have been involved in negotia-
tions to review and reform the mechanism since late 1997, however, with-
out coming to an agreement so far.
This article gives an overview of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism
ten years after it entered into force. Chapter 2 briefly presents the struc-
ture of the mechanism. Chapter 3 includes basic data on the use of the
system during its first ten years and its perception in academic literature.
Chapter 4 deals with efforts of Members to further develop the DSU in
the so-called “DSU Review”, which has so far remained unsuccessful.
Chapter 5 concludes and attempts to give an outlook on the challenges
that await the DSU in the coming years.
28 Thomas A. Zimmermann2 The Dispute Settlement Procedure in the DSU
In short,the Dispute Settlement Understanding
1 provides for a procedure
that starts with mandatory consultations as a diplomatic element. If the
disputing governments cannot agree to a settlement during these consul-
tations within a certain period, or if the defending party does not respond
to the consultations request, the complainant may request a panel to re-
view the matter. Panels are composed ad hoc and they consist of normally
three specialists who engage in fact-finding and apply the relevant WTO
provisions to the dispute at hand.Their findings and recommendations
are published in a report against which either or both of the parties may
appeal. Unless there is an appeal, the reports are adopted in a quasi-auto-
matic adoption procedure by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) where
all WTO Members are represented by a delegate. “Quasi-automatic”
adoption means that the reports are adopted unless the DSB decides by
consensus (i.e. including the party that has prevailed) not to adopt the re-
port.
In case of an appeal, however, the Appellate Body reviews the issues of
law and legal interpretations in the panel report that are subject to the
appeal.The Appellate Body is a standing body composed of seven jurists,
three of whom work on each case.The Appellate Body can uphold, mod-
ify or reverse the panel’s findings.After this appellate review, no further
recourse is possible.The DSB will adopt the report in the quasi-automatic
adoption procedure described above. If it is found that a trade measure is
in violation of WTO law, the defendant shall bring the measure into com-
pliance with the covered agreements within a reasonable period of time,
normally not exceeding 15 months. If the defendant refuses to comply, the
complainant may ask the defendant to enter into negotiations on com-
pensation, or may seek authorisation from the DSB to suspend conces-
sions or other obligations (SCOO) vis-à-vis the defendant at an amount
equivalent to the injury suffered. If the adequacy of implementation is
disputed, the implementation measures are subject to further review un-
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1 The text of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (as laid down in Annex 2 to the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization) is available via the Internet: http://www.
wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu.pdf (downloaded 5 February 2005). As a detailed discussion of
the DSU procedure is beyond the scope of this article, readers are invited to consult the rich body of
literature on this topic. For an introduction and a discussion of the system, see, for instance GAL-
LAGHER (2002) for a detailed guide to the procedure, JACKSON (2001) for an introduction, DAVEY
(2002b), GOH and WITBREUK (2001), FELICIANO and VAN DEN BOSSCHE (2001), HOEKMAN and
KOSTECKI (2001, Chapter 3), PALMETER and MAVROIDIS (1999), TREBILCOCK and HOWSE (1999,
Chapter 3 for an introductory overview), JACKSON (1998), JACKSON (1997, Chapter 4), PETERSMANN
(1997a), and PETERSMANN (1997b).der the DSU.The suspension of concessions or other obligations,if author-
ised, normally takes the form of punitive tariffs on a defined value of the
complainant’s imports from the defendant.The structure of the dispute
settlement mechanism (key elements only) is summarised in Graph 1.
Graph 1 Simplified Overview of the Dispute Settlement Procedure under
the DSU
Source: Graph by the author.
The DSU as of today thus presents a codified procedure that combines
elements of both political negotiation and adjudication. In today’s mech-
anism, the political, negotiation-oriented elements include, inter alia,
mandatory confidential consultations, tactical elements during the panel
stage (establishment of panels only at second meeting where the panel re-
quest appears on the DSB agenda, possibility to suspend the panel proce-
dures upon complainant’s request, interim review), and the subordination
of the entire procedure to a “political” body, as the competence to adopt
panel and Appellate Body reports rests with the Dispute Settlement









































30 Thomas A. Zimmermannsion of concessions or other obligations (SCOO) in the case of non-imple-
mentation of recommendations, is negotiation-oriented and exclusively
based on the political concept of reciprocity, as it can hardly be regarded
as supportive of the security and predictability of a rule-oriented multi-
lateral trading system.The special and differential treatment (S&D) of
developing countries under the DSU is also a political feature.
Rule-oriented elements include among others the conformity and notifi-
cation requirements with regard to mutually agreed solutions; the right to
a panel (more generally: the removal of blocking possibilities in the pro-
cess);the appellate review stage;and the prohibition of unauthorised,uni-
lateral retaliatory action.These elements seek to secure the conformity of
trade policy measures and dispute outcomes with the relevant provisions
of WTO law. Other features of the system such as third party rights also
support rule-orientation.
3 Experiences with the WTO Dispute Settlement System
3.1 Use of the Procedure
During the first ten years of its application (i.e. between 1 January 1995
and 31 December 2004), a total of 324 consultation requests was notified
to the WTO.
2 Compared to the less than 300 cases submitted to GATT
dispute settlement in 47 years, this number already shows that the new
system is quite popular among Members. However, these numbers should
not be over-interpreted:The old GATT had less Members than the WTO,
and it covered fewer agreements and sectors of economic activity than
the WTO.
Graph 2 shows the intensity in the use of the dispute settlement mechan-
ism in its first ten years, i.e. until 31 December 2004.The number of com-
plaints increased sharply in the first three years after the mechanism had
come into force, and it peaked in 1997 with 50 new consultation requests
in one single year.Thereafter, the number of consultation requests drop-
ped to an annual average of 30 complaints in the period from 2000 to
2003, and further to only 20 new complaints in 2004, the lowest number
since inception of the new system.The evolution of the number of panel
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2 See WTO Document No. WT/DS/OV/22, and Internet: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
dispu_status_e.htm.reports circulated displays a similar pattern, yet with a certain time lag
and a peak in 2000.This time lag is obvious, given the time required be-
tween the notification of a consultation request and the circulation of a
panel report. Overall, the number of panel reports is much lower than the
number of consultation requests.This shows that mutually agreed solu-
tions can be found in a considerable number of disputes prior to the cir-
culation of the panel report (consultation or panel stage). Moreover, in
some cases, several separate consultation requests are dealt with by one
single panel (e.g. in cases with multiple complainants), which equally con-
tributes to the difference in numbers.
Graph 2 Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism (1995–2004)
Note: Numbers refer to standard DSU complaints. Some of the panel reports
circulated in 2004 may still become the subject of an appeal in 2005. The
low ratio of panel reports appealed in 2004 must therefore be interpreted
cautiously.
Source: Graph by the author, based on data from Internet: http://www.worldtrade
law.net (downloaded 15 January 2005).
The number of Appellate Body reports peaked in 1999.While every panel
report circulated in 1996 and 1997 had been subject to an appeal, this ra-
tio dropped to an average of below two thirds for panel reports circulated
after 2000. Overall, there have been relatively few complaints under
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Art. 21.5 Complaints
Ratio of panel reports that were later appealed
32 Thomas A. Zimmermannpanel rulings (compliance reviews).The fairly small number is in stark
contrast to the public perception of these “trade wars” as they concern
“high profile” cases, including EC – Bananas,
3 EC – Hormones,
4 and U.S. –
Foreign Sales Corporations.
5
In terms of usage by country, the United States and the European Com-
munities (EC) have been the DSU’s most frequent users by far:Together,
they account for nearly half of the cases brought before the WTO (see
Graph 3).Among developing countries, Brazil and India are the most im-
portant users of the system. Developing countries’ participation in dispute
settlement proceedings is generally increasing, but still on a relatively
modest level, given the high number of developing countries in the WTO.
The near absence of LDCs in dispute settlement activities is another sali-
ent feature:The first LDC to lodge a complaint was Bangladesh. In early
2004, the country asked for consultations with neighbouring India regarding
Indian anti-dumping measures against battery imports from Bangladesh.
6
Graph 3 Main Users of the WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995–2004)
Note: EC figures for cases where the EC is a respondent do not include DS
numbers of complaints against individual EC members.
Source: Graph by the author, based on data from Internet: http://www.worldtrade
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3 WT/DS27: European Communities – Regime for the importation, sale and distribution of bananas
(brought by Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and the U.S.).
4 WT/DS26: European Communities – Measures concerning meat and meat products (hormones)
(brought by the U.S.).
5 WT/DS108: United States – Tax treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” (brought by the EC).
6 WT/DS306: India – Anti-dumping measure on batteries from Bangladesh (brought by Bangladesh).Regarding the subject matter, by far most disputes concern trade in
goods,with the GATT being the agreement whose provisions are most of-
ten invoked in disputes.This dominance of goods trade in WTO dispute
settlement becomes even more apparent when the complaints relating to
the special agreements in the goods sector (in particular those dealing
with trade remedies such as the Agreement on Subsidies and Counter-
vailing Measures and the Agreement on Antidumping) are taken into ac-
count (see Graph 4).
Graph 4 Agreements whose Provisions were Subject to Litigation 
(1995–2004)
Source: Graph by the author, based on data from Internet: http://www.worldtrade
law.net (downloaded 15 January 2005).
By comparison to this traditional realm of GATT law, the “new issues” –
i.e. trade in services (GATS) and trade-related intellectual property rights
(TRIPS) – have not yet been frequent subjects of WTO disputes, and
their statistical importance in dispute settlement seems to decrease even
further:A modest 25 complaints have been brought under the TRIPS, only
five of which were brought in the five-year period 2000–2004. Never-

















34 Thomas A. Zimmermanntheless, it should be noted that one particularly “high profile” case – a dis-
pute between the U.S. and the EC on the one hand, and India on the
other, regarding patent protection of pharmaceutical and agricultural
chemical products – ranges among these disputes.
7 Similarly, there have
not been frequent disputes under the GATS: Of the 14 complaints that
have been brought under this agreement,only five were lodged in the five-
year period 2000–2004. Here as well, disputes included a prominent case
of both political and economic importance, i.e. a U.S. complaint against
Mexican measures affecting telecommunications.
8
3.2 Perception in Scholarly Literature
The WTO dispute settlement system has attracted a remarkable amount
of academic attention. It has been reflected by a myriad of scholarly pub-
lications on the system from a variety of disciplines and on a variety of as-
pects. In addition to monographs and edited volumes, both established
and new periodical publications which have emerged over the last few
years (such as the Journal of International Economic Law and the World
Trade Review) devote considerable space to articles on WTO dispute
settlement.Among academic disciplines, legal scholars were the first to
analyse the system, showing from early on an interest in the legal inter-
pretations of panels and, in particular, of the Appellate Body, as well as in
the systemic aspects of the new procedure.
In this literature, the system received a particularly warm, if not enthusi-
astic, welcome.According to BHALA (1999), a sizeable portion of this lit-
erature is “characterised by a near irrational exuberance … about the
new adjudicatory system”.The DSU has been called a “crown jewel” and
a “core linchpin” of the multilateral trading system.
9 HUDEC (1998) noted
that trading nations granted an “unprecedented degree of power to a le-
gal tribunal” to enforce the obligations under the WTO Agreement.The
DSU has also been hailed as a model for other international organisa-
tions, and it has brought forth a debate on the “constitutionalisation” of
international trade law.
10
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7 WT/DS50: India – Patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products (brought
by the U.S.); WT/DS79: India – Patent protection for pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical pro-
ducts (brought by the EC).
8 WT/DS204: Mexico – Measures affecting telecommunications services (brought by the U.S.).
9 See BHALA (1999), p. 856 ff for quotations.
10 See, for instance, the many contributions by PETERSMANN, including PETERSMANN (1999, 1998a, 1998b,
1997). For an overview of the debate, see DUVIGNEAU (2001).Specifically, the quasi-automaticity in the establishment of panels as well
as in the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports was among the
most-lauded elements.This quasi-automaticity removed blockage possi-
bilities for losing defendants that had existed in dispute settlement under
the old GATT.The introduction of precise time-limits was equally seen as
a highly positive step. From a legal point of view, the introduction of an
appellate review mechanism and the institution of a permanent Appellate
Body composed of highly-qualified lawyers were greeted as particularly
important contributions towards improved legal quality of decisions and
as a further step towards the rule of law in trade matters.
11 More general-
ly, this appellate review system was greeted as a model for other areas of
international public law.
HUDEC (1999, pp. 4 and 9) has warned, however, not to overstate the dif-
ferences between the new DSU and the former procedure under the
GATT.With regard to the removal of blocking possibilities, HUDEC holds
that blockage did not play too prominent a role in GATT practice either,
as there was a community consensus that every Member should have a
right to have its claims heard by an impartial third-party decision-maker.
Moreover, GATT dispute settlement had already become a more judicial
instrument in the late 1970s and 1980s, where the cornerstones were laid
for the later evolution towards the DSU.As HUDEC (1999, p. 11) argues
with regard to the success of dispute settlement in the 1980s, an interna-
tional legal system does not require rigorously binding procedures to be
generally effective but requisite political will can achieve much.As to this
author, stringent procedures by themselves are not likely to make a legal
system effective unless they are buttressed by sufficient political support.
He cautioned, therefore, that even the new system would not lead to
100% compliance.As under the GATT, countries would be unable or un-
willing to comply in specific cases under WTO dispute settlement rules as
well.The system would accordingly have to learn to live with legal failure.
Indeed, legal literature began to take these problems into account to-
wards the end of the 1990s as implementation problems surged in a num-
ber of high profile cases, including, inter alia, EC – Bananas, EC – Hor-
mones, and U.S. – Foreign Sales Corporations. In these cases, the refusal of
defendants to implement the DSB recommendations triggered the sus-
pension of concessions or other obligations (SCOO) by the complainant
government under authorisation from the Dispute Settlement Body.
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11 See, for instance, the many contributions by JACKSON or PETERSMANN.More commonly known under terms like “retaliation” or “sanctions”, the
SCOO itself has become the focus of much criticism: by suspending con-
cessions or other obligations, the complainant government usually harms
its own economy (as it curbs previous trade which, presumably, was in the
economic interest of both parties) as well as individual economic actors in
both countries who are not responsible for the defendant government’s
failure to implement the DSB recommendations properly. Similar to any
other import restriction, the SCOO weakens the competitiveness of the
complainant’s domestic industries, including its exporters, because it shuts
out competitive raw materials or intermediate products. It may also pro-
mote rent-seeking behaviour in the complainant’s newly-protected indus-
tries and undermine their long-term competitiveness. On a general level,
the SCOO reduces the predictability of trade conditions which the WTO
is normally set to preserve, as every concession and trade rule can be re-
voked as part of a SCOO. Moreover, developing and small countries have
difficulties in using the SCOO as they usually lack the market size to make
a credible retaliatory threat.The difficulties faced by developing coun-
tries were illustrated in Ecuador’s complaint against the EC non-compli-
ance in the Bananas case. Retaliation may also have a negative impact on
third countries, for instance, if their industries supply inputs to industries
in the defendant country. Finally, the SCOO has a problematic psycholog-
ical connotation as it creates the erroneous impression that trade restric-
tions would make a country better off.
12 In addition to implementation
problems in cases that were subject to an Article 21.5 compliance dispute,
the actual degree of market opening as a consequence of “implemented”
DSB rulings has been questioned as well.
13
Other problems identified with the new procedure include the often poor
respect of the deadlines laid down in the DSU, the lack of a remand pro-
cedure which would allow the Appellate Body to remand certain issues
back to the panels for further factual clarification, and the problems of
developing countries wishing to participate more actively in the system.
More recently, some quite strong criticism has been spelt out on the juris-
prudence of the Appellate Body in trade remedy cases.The gist of this
criticism is that the adjudicating bodies are exceeding their authority and
are legislating instead of adjudicating, that they are not showing sufficient
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12 For a discussion of the SCOO, see, inter alia, CHARNOVITZ (2003, 2001), ANDERSON (2002), HUDEC
(2000), and MAVROIDIS (2000). A critical view of the current focus on retaliation from an industry per-
spective is included in UNICE (2001).
13 See ZIMMERMANN (2001) for a discussion of implementation measures in WT/DS31: Canada –
Measures prohibiting or restricting importation of certain periodicals (brought by the U.S.).deference to Members’ trade policy decisions, and that the system is bi-
ased towards trade liberalisation.
14 However, for the time being, strong
criticism may be considered a minority view in literature.And, as some
observers hold,“it is not always clear that some of the harshest critics of
WTO jurisprudence, many of whom have advocacy roles related to a va-
riety of special interests, have the best interests of the overall WTO sys-
tem in mind.”
15
Yet, there is a real concern about what some commentators perceive to
be an imbalance between relatively effective legal decision-making by the
adjudicating bodies and ineffective political decision-making by the
political bodies of the WTO.
16 Unlike the lengthy search for compromise
at the negotiating table, the quasi-automatic architecture of the DSU allows
complainants to exact decisions on politically highly sensitive issues from
the dispute settlement system. It is therefore hardly surprising that the
DSU is the forum of choice for governments that perceive their position
to be in accordance with WTO rules.The danger associated with such a
trend is that Member governments that see their interests insufficiently
safeguarded might be driven out of the system.This would be particularly
problematic if large Members with “systemic weight” were to retreat
from the system.
There are currently two strands in DSU literature that seek to strike a
balance between the relative success and well-functioning of the dispute
settlement system with its adjudicative bodies on the one hand, and the
weakness of the consensus-based political decision-making at the WTO
on the other. One school of thought – probably the minority point of view
– seeks to re-strengthen political control of WTO dispute settlement and
to weaken its adjudication character.
17 According to BARFIELD (2001), for
instance, the WTO should adopt a less rigid, more flexible dispute settle-
ment system. Specifically, the author suggests, inter alia, mandatory re-
course to political dispute resolution in highly-politicised disputes and the
re-introduction of a blocking mechanism. In addition, BARFIELD recom-
mends that the U.S. should continue to deny direct effect to WTO provi-
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14 See, for instance, GREENWALD (2003), MAGNUS, JONEJA and YOCIS (2003), RAGOSTA, JONEJA and
ZELDOVICH (2003), WILSON and STARCHUK (2003), as well as RAGOSTA, JONEJA and ZELDOVICH (no
year specified).
15 See CONSULTATIVE BOARD (2004), p. 55.
16 See, for instance, EHLERMANN (2002b).
17 See BARFIELD (2002, 2001). An earlier contribution to the discussion from a critical perspective is
HIPPLER BELLO (1996).sions, and he calls for increased congressional oversight as a means of in-
creasing the democratic accountability and legitimacy of the WTO.
Other authors, however, oppose any effort to weaken the adjudicating
system and argue in favour of focussing reform efforts on improved poli-
tical decision-making.
18 For instance, SCHOTT and WATAL (2000) propose
the establishment of a small, informal steering committee with roughly 20
seats,distributed according to both the value of foreign trade and the goal
of achieving global geographic representation – an approach similar to
the composition of the Boards governing the IMF and the World Bank.
Such a structure would still allow the continuation of decision-making by
consensus, as the proponents explicitly abstain from suggesting propor-
tional or weighted voting.Accordingly, the main strength of the proposal
lies in facilitating the preparation of decisions and the search for a con-
sensus.
Focussing more narrowly on the problem of “legislative response” to de-
cisions by adjudicating bodies, COTTIER and TAKENOSHITA (2003) base
their suggestions on the diagnosis that both the amendment and the inter-
pretation of provisions in the multilateral trade agreements are virtually
impossible: Members whose interpretation prevailed in a panel or Appel-
late Body proceeding will usually not agree to the interpretation of the
losing party.Therefore, consensus is illusory, and a three fourths majority
(if voting ever happens) is extremely difficult to achieve. Similarly, at-
tempts to amend the agreement are likely to fail as well unless the nego-
tiations take place in a wider context (i.e. in a trade round) where the
points at issue can be traded.This, however, is a lengthy process.The au-
thors wish to facilitate the conditions for legislative response, not least in
order to liberate the Appellate Body from what they perceive as extreme
judicial restraint and to allow it to make “forward-looking, purposing in-
terpretations and clarifications”.
19 The authors therefore suggest a transi-
tion towards voting. However, current membership structures would not
allow voting along the lines of a “one state = one vote” formula as the 24
industrial member countries, corresponding to 79% of GDP, would only
have 16,8% of the votes. Based on a calculation of voting weights and re-
lated power assessments, the authors propose a weighted voting model
that uses trade shares, GDP, market openness, population variables and
basic votes.
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18 See EHLERMANN (2003, 2002a, 2002b), JACKSON (2002), STEGER (2002b), as well as COTTIER and
TAKENOSHITA (2003).
19 COTTIER and TAKENOSHITA (2003), p. 175.Whereas most of the literature on WTO dispute settlement originates
from the legal discipline, the mechanism has also become the topic of a
growing body of theoretical
20 and empirical
21 literature in economics and
political science. By and large, this research appears to confirm that the
differences between dispute settlement under the old GATT and the new
WTO should not be overrated.They explain the functioning of the system
mainly with “soft” factors such as the reputation costs of non-compliance;
normative pressures of rulings; the inherent exchange of information; the
stability which the WTO dispute settlement system yields to the multilat-
eral trading system by allowing governments to deviate from agreed rules
against payment of compensation in its broadest sense; flexibility; and the
provision of a renegotiation mechanism.These theoretical and empirical
contributions thus underline the importance of the (political) concept of
reciprocity: dispute settlement has to safeguard the negotiated balance of
rights and obligations as well as to prevent (and remedy, if necessary) the
nullification or impairment of benefits accruing under these agreements.
It is the balance of political support which governments have exchanged
in trade negotiations that needs to be protected if the system is to work.
The findings of these studies are thus in line with the basic thrust of the
political economy of international trade relations.
4A ttempts to Reform the DSU:The DSU Review Negotiations
The accumulated experience of WTO Members with dispute settlement
under the DSU constitutes the foundation of the current negotiations to
review and reform the DSU.This DSU review started already in 1997.
However, it could not be concluded so far as several deadlines lapsed
without tangible achievements.The last deadline missed so-far had been
set for May 2004.As part of the so-called “July package” adopted on 1
August 2004, the mandate to continue the negotiations has been renewed,
however,without a new deadline being set.
Despite their lack of success, the discussions are of interest as they track
the evolution of country interests and negotiating positions in the dispute
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20 See, for example, ROSENDORFF (2004), ROSENDORFF and MILNER (2001), ETHIER (2001), HAUSER
(2001), BÜTLER and HAUSER (2000), MAGGI (1999), BAGWELL and STAIGER (1999), HAUSER and
MARTEL (1997), MITCHELL (1997), and KOVENOCK and THURSBY (1997).
21 See, for example, GUZMAN and SIMMONS (2002), BUSCH (2000), BUSCH and REINHARDT (2003a, 2003b,
2000), REINHARDT (2001, 2001a, 2000, 2000a), HUDEC (1999), SEVILLA (1998, 1997), and HUDEC
(1993). An excellent overview is BUSCH and REINHARDT (2002), also embarking upon the methodo-
logical problems that researchers face when dealing empirically with the DSU.settlement system. Moreover, they point to opportunities perceived for
improvements to the system and to the general degree of satisfaction with
the system.The latter is of particular importance in a “member-driven or-
ganization”.Whereas a full account of the negotiating process and of the
many heterogeneous proposals submitted by Members would be beyond
the scope of this paper,
22 a brief summary of the stages of the negotia-
tions process and of the major proposals received shall be given.
4.1 The Initial Stage of DSU Review Negotiations (1997–1999)
23
Negotiations in the early stages took place under a 1994 Ministerial
Declaration and were supposed to conclude by the Third Ministerial
Conference, i.e. by the Seattle meeting. Several Members participated in
these largely informal negotiations (inter alia the European Communities,
Canada, India, Guatemala, the United States,Venezuela, Hungary, Korea,
Argentina, Japan) as a range of issues was discussed.Yet, the negotiations
were mainly characterised by two divides – one ran between industrial-
ised countries (mainly between the U.S. and the EC) whereas the other
pitted industrialised against developing countries.
The rift between industrialised countries was mostly due to the efforts of
the United States to strengthen the enforcement quality of the system.
Being a “net complainant” in these initial years of DSU practice, and hav-
ing won several “high profile” cases (such as EC – Hormones, EC – Bana-
nas, Canada – Magazines, or India – Patents), the United States became
increasingly worried that the implementation of the reports would remain
behind their expectations.They therefore pressed forward with retalia-
tory measures and threats thereof, whereas the EC and Canada tried to
delay the implementation of rulings.This translated into different propos-
als for the DSU review negotiations on the so-called sequencing issue
which arose for the first time in EC – Bananas over ambiguities (or even
contradictions, as some may argue) in Art. 21.5/22 DSU.The key question
was whether a “compliance panel” must first review the implementation
measures undertaken by a defendant before a complainant may seek
authorisation to retaliate on grounds of the defendant’s alleged non-com-
pliance.Whereas the U.S. initially opposed any idea of sequencing and fa-
voured immediate retaliation, the EC and many other Members argued
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MANN (2003) and in ZIMMERMANN (2004a).
23 For a detailed discussion and further references, see ZIMMERMANN (2004a), pp. 79–91.in favour of the completion of such a compliance panel procedure as a
prerequisite to seeking an authorisation to retaliate.The EC underlined
its position, inter alia, by bringing a DSU case against U.S. legislation re-
quiring early retaliation
24 and against its application
25 in EC – Bananas, as
well as by seeking an authoritative interpretation of the DSU in this res-
pect.
26 Both attempts ultimately failed.
Another attempt by the U.S. to increase the enforcement power of WTO
dispute settlement occurred when it discussed the so-called “carousel re-
taliation”.This term refers to periodic modifications of the list of pro-
ducts that are subject to the suspension of concessions, and it surfaced for
the first time when the “Carousel Retaliation Act of 1999” was intro-
duced into Congress. Its purpose was to increase pressure on the EC
Commission and European governments in EC – Bananas and EC –
Hormones by requiring the government to periodically rotate the list of
products subject to retaliation in order to maximise the effect of the sanc-
tions.The measure was signed into law in May 2000 but has so far never
been applied.Whereas the EC (supported by most other nations) sought
a prohibition of carousel retaliation in the DSU review of 1998/1999, the
U.S. had sought a footnote explicitly allowing such retaliation. In a paral-
lel development, the EC had requested consultations under the DSU on
the carousel provision in summer 2000, however, without proceeding to
the panel stage.
27
Finally, the U.S. did not only pursue a “tough stance” on sequencing and
on the carousel issue, but it also sought shorter timelines for certain steps
in WTO dispute settlement.
The controversy between developed and developing countries was of a
different nature. It mainly focused on the issue of transparency and the
acceptance of so-called “amicus curiae briefs”, with the United States
pressing hardest for both. Regarding transparency, the U.S. wanted to
make submissions of parties to panels and the Appellate Body public, and
it wanted to allow public observance of panel and Appellate Body meet-
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24 WT/DS152: United States – Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (brought by the EC).
25 WT/DS165: United States – Import measures on certain products from the European Communities
(brought by the EC).
26 WT/GC/W/143: Request for an Authoritative Interpretation Pursuant to Article IX.2 of the Marra-
kesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (Communication by the EC to the
General Council).
27 WT/DS200: United States — Section 306 of the Trade Act of 1974 and amendments thereto (brought
by the EC).ings. Developing countries in particular, but also some industrialised
countries, opposed such increased transparency, as they feared “trials by
media” and undue public pressure.
28 Insisting on the intergovernmental
nature of the WTO, developing countries equally rejected efforts by the
U.S. and the EC to formalise the acceptance of amicus curiae, or “friend
of the court”, briefs. Amicus curiae briefs are unsolicited reports which a
private person or entity submits to an adjudicative body in order to sup-
port (and possibly influence) its decision-making.These briefs became an
issue for the first time in 1998 when the Appellate Body decided in U.S. –
Shrimp/Turtle
29 that the panel had the authority to accept unsolicited
amicus curiae briefs.That right was subsequently confirmed in further dis-
putes, causing outrage among many developing country Members who
feared undue interference from NGOs.
30
4.2 The “Limbo” in the DSU Review Negotiations (2000-2001)
31
After the December 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference had failed, the
DSU review essentially remained in limbo through most of 2000 and
2001. Isolated efforts of Members to change the DSU failed. However, as
DSU practice moved along, negotiating positions changed behind the
scenes. New developments in the case U.S. – Foreign Sales Corporations
which the U.S. had lost and where implementation measures were now
disputed,weakened in particular the U.S.position on issues such as carou-
sel or sequencing:After it had become increasingly clear that the U.S. re-
placement legislation (Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act; ETI) would
not be in compliance with the DSB recommendations, the U.S. and the
EC negotiated in September 2000 a bilateral procedural agreement on
how to proceed in this case in order to bridge the gaps in the DSU on the
sequencing issue.According to the Agreement, a sequencing approach
was adopted under which a panel (subject to appeal) would review the
WTO consistency of the replacement legislation, and arbitration on the
appropriate level of sanctions would be conducted only if the replace-
ment legislation was found WTO-inconsistent.The U.S. had now become
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transparency. See ZIMMERMANN (2004a), pp. 157 ff for an introductory discussion and further refer-
ences.
29 WT/DS58: United States – Import prohibition of shrimp and shrimp products (brought by India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand).
30 On the amicus curiae issue, see, for instance, UMBRICHT (2001), MAVROIDIS (2001), MARCEAU and
STILWELL (2001). For further references, see also ZIMMERMANN (2004a), pp. 163 ff.
31 For a detailed discussion and further references, see ZIMMERMANN (2004a), pp. 92–99.a beneficiary of the sequencing approach (even with the possibility of
subsequent appeal) which it had opposed before. It is believed that, in
exchange for the agreement, the U.S. had to back down on carousel retal-
iation although no such deal had been explicitly made part of the proce-
dural agreement.The retaliatory measures requested by the EC were sev-
eral times higher than U.S. retaliation in EC – Bananas and EC – Hor-
mones combined.
32 The arbitrators later confirmed that the suspension of
concessions in the form of 100% ad valorem duties on imports worth
4.043 bn USD constituted “appropriate countermeasures”.
US – Foreign Sales Corporations was not the only case that had a weaken-
ing impact on the negotiating stance of the U.S.:With more and more trade
remedy cases – traditionally the Achilles heel of U.S. trade policy – being
brought against the U.S.and the latter losing most of these,the U.S.stance
changed from offensive into highly defensive (see Graphs 5 and 6).
Graph 5 The United States as Complainant and Defendant (1995–2004)
Source: Graph by the author, based on WTO data: WT/DS/OV/22 and Internet:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (down-
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32 The respective amounts are USD 191.4m in EC – Bananas and USD 116.8m in EC – Hormones.Graph 6 The United States as Defendant:Trade Remedy and Other Cases
Source: Graph by the author, based on WTO data: WT/DS/OV/22 and Internet:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (down-
loaded 15 January 2005).
As attempts to move the DSU review forward in 2000 and 2001 proved to
be unsuccessful, the DSU review only returned to the fore at the Fourth
Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001.The Doha Ministerial
Declaration committed Members to negotiate on improvements to and
clarifications of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
4.3 The Doha-Mandated DSU Review Negotiations (2002–2004)
33
According to the Doha mandate on the DSU Review, an agreement was
to be reached not later than May 2003. Formal and informal discussions
were held under the auspices of the Special Negotiating Session of the
Dispute Settlement Body, chaired by PÉTER BALÁS of Hungary. Work
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Complaints Against the U.S. Regarding Trade Remedies (Anti-Dumping,
Safeguards, Countervailing Measures)
WTO Dispute Settlement at Ten: Evolution, Experiences, and Evaluation 45
33 See also Paragraph 47 of the Ministerial Declaration, Adopted on 14 November 2001 (WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1). For a detailed discussion and further references, see Zimmermann (2004a), pp. 100–109.tual proposals put forward by Members.In total,42 specific proposals had
been submitted by the deadline of the negotiations at the end of May
2003.The negotiations were very comprehensive: Not only did they cover
virtually all provisions of the DSU,
34 but they also included a variety of
Members, including, inter alia, all the “Quad” Members (with submissions
being made by the EC, the U.S., Canada and Japan) as well as developing
countries of all sizes and stages of development.
Compared to the pre-Seattle stage of DSU review negotiations, negotiat-
ing positions were less clear-cut now.The most remarkable change occur-
red in the position of the United States, which reflected its new defensive
stance in dispute settlement practice. In December 2002 the U.S. submit-
ted, jointly with Chile, a proposal to strengthen flexibility and member
control in dispute settlement.
35 The proposal would allow the deletion of
portions of panel or Appellate Body reports by agreement of the parties
to a dispute, and an only partial adoption of such reports. Moreover, it
calls for “some form of additional guidance” to WTO adjudicative bodies.
The gist of the submission is to transfer influence from the adjudicative
bodies to the parties to disputes.The proposal was greeted predominantly
with scepticism, with Members arguing that deleting parts of panel or
Appellate Body reports would weaken the WTO adjudicating bodies.
Moreover, the move was seen as a contradiction to earlier proposals on
improving transparency as parties would be able to “bury” more contro-
versial or groundbreaking decisions by the adjudicating bodies before the
rulings were made public.The proposal was understood as attending to
the complaints from Congress that the WTO adjudicating bodies were
legislating.
A large number of other proposals, only some of which can be presented
here, were submitted.The EC called again for the establishment of a per-
manent panel body instead of the current system where panellists are ap-
pointed ad hoc, discharging their tasks on a part-time basis and in addi-
tion to their ordinary duties.
36 Opponents of the proposal argue that a
permanent panel body could be more “ideological” and might engage in
lawmaking.They therefore feel more comfortable with the current system
46 Thomas A. Zimmermann
34 For an overview, see ZIMMERMANN (2004a), pp. 111–155 on stage-related proposals and pp. 157–193
on horizontal proposals.
35 See TN/DS/W/28 (U.S., Chile) for the conceptual proposal, and TN/DS/W/52 (U.S., Chile) for the tex-
tual proposal. For a discussion of this proposal, see EHLERMANN (2003). See also the critical remarks in
CONSULTATIVE BOARD (2004), p. 56, which obviously refer to the U.S.-Chilean proposal.
36 See TN/DS/W/1, No. I (EC), and Attachment, No. 7.which draws heavily on government officials who are familiar with the
constraints faced by governments.
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Developing countries submitted a variety of proposals with quite differ-
ent orientations. For instance, some countries sought to strengthen en-
forcement by introducing collective retaliation.
38 It is meant to address
the problems caused by the lack of retaliatory power of many small
developing economies, such as those experienced by Ecuador in EC –
Bananas. With collective retaliation, all WTO Members would be author-
ised (or even obliged under the concept of collective responsibility) to
suspend concessions vis-à-vis a non-complying Member. Proposals for the
retroactive calculation of the level of nullification and impairment and for
making the SCOO a negotiable instrument (Mexico),
39 for introducing a
fast-track panel procedure (Brazil),
40 and for calculating increased levels
of nullification or impairment (Ecuador)
41 have a similar thrust.At the
same time, the African Group questioned the automaticity of the current
dispute settlement process and sought the re-introduction of more politi-
cal elements.
42 China even proposed the introduction of a quantitative
limitation on the number of complaints per year that countries could
bring against a particular developing country.
43
By contrast to these controversial proposals, a large number of less con-
troversial issues were integrated into a compromise text that was elabo-
rated by Ambassador PÉTER BALÁS of Hungary. This so-called BALÁS
text
44 contains modifications to all stages of the process, including im-
proved notification requirements for mutually agreed solutions, a proce-
dure to overcome the “sequencing issue” in Art. 21.5/22 DSU, the intro-
duction of an interim review in the panel stage, and a remand procedure
in which an issue may be remanded to the original panel in case the
Appellate Body is not able to fully address an issue due to a lack of factu-
al information in the panel report.The compromise text would also have
introduced numerous amendments in other areas, including, inter alia,
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37 The proposal has been discussed intensely in scholarly literature. See, for instance, PETERSMANN
(2002), pp. 14–15, and STEGER (2002a), pp. 63–64, for brief introductions. Support for the idea is ex-
pressed, to varying degrees, by BOURGEOIS (2003), COTTIER (2003, 2002), and DAVEY (2003, 2002b). A
more cautious approach is contained in CARTLAND (2003), HECHT (2000), and in SHOYER (2003).
38 See TN/DS/W/15, No. 6, and TN/DS/W/42, No IX (both submitted by the African Group) as well as
TN/DS/W/17 (LDC Group). For a discussion on collective retaliation, see PAUWELYN (2000).
39 See TN/DS/W/23 and TN/DS/W/40 (both submitted by Mexico).
40 See TN/DS/W/45 and TN/DS/W/45/Rev.1 (Brazil).
41 See TN/DS/W/9 and TN/DS/W/33 (both submitted by Ecuador). 
42 See TN/DS/W/15 and TN/DS/W/42 (both submitted by the African Group).
43 See TN/DS/W/29, No. 1, and TN/DS/W/57, No. 1 (both submitted by China).
44 See TN/DS/9.housekeeping proposals, enhanced third party rights, enhanced compen-
sation, and several provisions on the special and differential treatment of
developing countries.
Despite the existence of a compromise proposal, the deadline for the
completion of talks that had been set for the end of May 2003 was finally
missed.While many smaller trading nations would have favoured coming
to a conclusion on a limited package of issues, both the EC and the U.S.
preferred negotiations to continue, and to address those (of their) con-
cerns that had been left out in the BALÁS text.
Members subsequently agreed to extend the deadline for the review until
the end of May 2004. However, the review negotiations did not re-gain
their previous momentum.The failure of the Fifth Ministerial Conference
held in Cancún, Mexico, in mid-September 2003 caused a further setback
to overall negotiations under the Doha mandate which also affected DSU
review negotiations.The May 2004 deadline was missed again.The Chair-
man then established a brief report on his own responsibility to the Trade
Negotiations Committee. He suggested continuing the negotiations, how-
ever, without any new target date.
45 In the subsequent decision adopted
by the General Council on 1 August 2004 on the Doha Work Programme
– the so-called “July Package” – the General Council took note of the
above-mentioned report and the continuation of negotiations according
to the Doha Mandate along the lines set out in the Chairman’s report was
decided.
46
The Special Negotiating Session of the DSB met two more times in
October and November 2004, yet without achieving any significant pro-
gress.
47 Negotiations will continue in 2005 with six dates being reserved
for further meetings before the summer break.
4.4 The Difficulties of Concluding the DSU Review
The difficulties faced by negotiators so far in their attempts to reach a
successful conclusion of the DSU review negotiations may be explained
48 Thomas A. Zimmermann
45 See TN/DS/10.
46 See WT/L/579.
47 See “DSU Review: Members Discuss May Proposal, Dispute Settlement Data”, in: BRIDGES Weekly
Trade News Digest, Vol. 8, No. 36, 27 October 2004; and BRIDGES Weekly Trade News Digest, Vol. 8,
No. 41, 1 December 2004.with a number of reasons: Firstly, the consensus requirement
48 for any
change to the DSU sets high hurdles, particularly as the WTO counts 148
heterogeneous Members with equally heterogeneous interests. These
problems are further exacerbated in the case of the DSU review where
negotiators are intending to reap an early harvest outside the larger con-
text of the Doha negotiations and thus within a narrow area of negotia-
tions. Secondly, key decisions of the adjudicative bodies and Members’
experience with the system have created controversial views on specific
aspects of the system that have become increasingly difficult to bridge
(e.g. on issues such as transparency, amicus curiae briefs, carousel retalia-
tion or collective retaliation – to mention but a few).Thirdly, and of fun-
damental importance, there appears to be a more profound controversy
regarding the overall direction the DSU should pursue, namely whether it
should continue its route towards more rule-orientation and adjudication,
or whether it should return to a more negotiatory and diplomatic – i.e.
power-oriented – approach.
49 Proposals with both orientations have been
submitted,as the non-exhaustive list of examples in Table 1 show.
Fourthly, some problems of the DSU review may be explained with the
difficulties of negotiating reforms to a system that is constantly in use:
Negotiating positions are subject to permanent change as Members con-
tinuously gather new experience due to new cases and new reports. More-
over, on-going negotiations on material WTO rules may also have a bear-
ing on the stance of Members towards the dispute settlement system (e.g.
the negotiations on “Rules”, including on anti-dumping). Such problems
can be partly remedied by the inclusion of generous periods of transition
for any change to the DSU.
Finally,despite the criticism that is occasionally voiced,there seems to be a
general sense of satisfaction with the system.As the CONSULTATIVE BOARD
(2004, p. 56) holds with regard to the lack of success of the DSU review to
date,“… an important underlying concern is, or should be, to not ’do any
harm’ to the existing system since it has so many valuable attributes.”
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48 See Article X.8 of the WTO Agreement.
49 For the purpose of this article, rule-orientation is understood as the heavy reliance on procedural and
material rules for the settlement of trade disputes. In such a setting, relatively much power and inde-
pendence are granted to adjudicative bodies, and the results of the adjudicative process are not subject
to political review. By contrast, negotiations and political power play a stronger role for the outcome
in a power-oriented dispute settlement procedure. In such a setting, disputing parties enjoy a large
amount of control and flexibility whereas less power is granted to adjudication bodies. Rule-orientati-
on and power-orientation as basic concepts for the settlement of international trade disputes were in-
troduced into the literature by JACKSON (1978). For a short overview, see JACKSON (1997), pp. 109 ff.
For a critical comment, see DUNNE III (2002).Table 1 Power Orientation versus Rule Orientation in the Doha Round
DSU Negotiations
Source: Table by the author; for more information see ZIMMERMANN (2004a), pp.
204–213.
4.5 The “DSU Review in Practice”
As negotiations on the DSU Review are stalled, practical solutions have
been found to some of the problems in what could be called a “DSU re-
form in practice”. It includes practical actions both by Members and by
the adjudicating bodies to further develop the system and to come to
terms with the problems in its application, as the following examples
show.
Firstly, the sequencing problem has been overcome by the conclusion of
bilateral agreements between the Members during the implementation
stage.These agreements allow Members to overcome the gaps and cont-
radictions in the DSU text in a practical way.Whereas there has not yet
been a consensus to adapt the DSU text to this evolving practice, Mem-
bers have adapted to the bilateral agreements and no longer appear to
consider the sequencing issue as a pressing concern.
Secondly, with regard to amicus curiae briefs, the Appellate Body has de
facto developed a very pragmatic approach, despite initially strong oppo-
Proposals strengthening rule orientation Proposals strengthening power orientation
• Strengthened notification requirements for 
mutually acceptable solutions and written 
reports on the outcome of consultations;
• Compliance reviews of mutually agreed 
solutions;
•R educed time frames;
•C reation of a professional permanent 
panel body (PPB);
•T erms of appointment of the Appellate 
Body;
•R egulating sequencing and 
implementation;
• Prohibition of carousel retaliation;
• Strengthening enforcement and the cost 
of non-compliance;
• Strengthening third party rights;
• Increasing external transparency.
•A utomatic lapse or withdrawal of
consultations/panel requests;
• Calls for separate opinions by individual 
panelists/Appellate Body Members;
•F lexibility during appellate review:
interim review and the suspension of the 
appellate procedures;
• Deletion of findings from reports;
•P artial adoption procedures;
•A dditional measures of special and 
differential treatment of developing 
countries;
• Extension of time-frames by agreement 
of the parties;
• Obliging adjudicating bodies to submit 
certain issues to the General Council 
for interpretation.
50 Thomas A. Zimmermannsition from mostly developing countries. On the one hand, the Appellate
Body displays a general openness towards the acceptance of amicus cur-
iae briefs. On the other hand, it does not appear to accord decisive weight
to these submissions in its decisions – at least not explicitly.This approach
gives adjudicating bodies a maximum of flexibility while it respects the
concerns of Members who are against such briefs.
Thirdly, on a related matter, the Appellate Body has found a response to
the concerns of many Members who held that the acceptance of amicus
curiae briefs gave NGOs an edge over Members, as the latter had to cope
with restrictive requirements on third country participation. It relaxed
these requirements by adopting new working procedures in late 2002
which give third parties the possibility of attending oral hearings even if
they had not made a written submission prior to the hearing, as the old
rule had required.
50 Similarly, the Appellate Body only recently adopted
new working procedures requiring more precision in notices of appeal. It
thus catered for a long standing concern of some Members who had cal-
led for increased precision of notices of appeal but were unable to reach
such a modification through the DSU review negotiations.
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As a final example, the establishment of an Advisory Centre on World
Trade Law (ACWL) has remedied some of the resource constraints that
developing countries face in the more sophisticated legal settings of the
new dispute settlement system.This international organisation, which is
independent from the WTO, provides legal training, support and advice
on WTO Law and dispute settlement procedures to developing countries,
in particular LDCs. ACWL services are available against payment of
modest fees for legal services varying with the share of world trade and
GNP per capita of user governments.
52 The Centre thus serves to a cer-
tain degree as a substitute for other institutions such as, for instance, a
special fund for developing countries – a proposal that has been brought
into the DSU review negotiations by developing countries.
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50 These modifications were introduced into document WT/AB/WP/7 (meanwhile replaced by WT/AB/
WP/8). See also “WTO Appellate Body Braces for Criticism For Easing Rules on Third Party Partici-
pation”; in: WTO Reporter, 10 October 2002; “WTO Appellate Body Chair Offers To Discuss Appel-
late Review Rules”; in WTO Reporter, 23 October 2002; and “Appellate Body to Clarify Working
Procedures on Role of Third Parties”, in: Inside US Trade, 15 November 2002.
51 WT/AB/WP/8. The new procedures entered into force on 1 January 2005.
52 For more information on the ACWL, see Internet: http://www.acwl.ch, and in particular http://www.
acwl.ch/e/quickguide_e.aspx (downloaded 5 February 2005).As these examples show, Members and adjudicating bodies manage to
adapt the dispute settlement system to changing circumstances without
changing one single provision of the DSU. Dispute settlement practice
has thus brought some amount of DSU reform, without facing the prob-
lems of political renegotiations of the DSU text. In other terms, the sys-
tem seems to build once more on its historic strength, which is to evolve
with a certain degree of flexibility and in a pragmatic spirit.We should
not be surprised if, as in the past, these elements of evolving practice were
to be codified into a new or modified text at a later date.
5 Conclusions
The first ten years of dispute settlement practice under the DSU have
confirmed the usefulness of the system: Except for a recent slowdown
which is yet too early to interpret, the mechanism has been used actively,
and the perception by both practitioners and academic observers has gen-
erally been positive. Nevertheless, the intense use of the mechanism has
also revealed certain problems in its practical application. Guided by
their own experiences and interests, Members have been attempting to
improve the mechanism through several rounds of DSU review negotia-
tions since late 1997. So far, all these attempts have been unsuccessful.
While negotiations are going on under the Doha Mandate, there is no clear
deadline and, subsequently, insufficient impetus for their conclusion. In
the mean time, Members and adjudicating bodies have managed to re-
solve some of the practical issues through a further development of dis-
pute settlement practice without amending the DSU text.
The major challenge for the DSU is not so much whether the multitude
of technical questions in the DSU review negotiations can be resolved
through an agreement but,rather,how well suited the DSU is to overcome
the more fundamental concern – notably that there is an unsustainable
imbalance between political and judicial decision-making in the WTO.
None of the two generic options that are being discussed to remedy the
situation – weakening adjudication or strengthening political decision-
making – holds great promise if considered in isolation. Weakening
adjudication is not an attractive option as Members would have to forego
the achievements which the new DSU has brought for a rules-based in-
ternational trading system. It would also be at odds with globalisation and
its increasing reliance on international transactions in economic life.
52 Thomas A. ZimmermannAlternatively, improving political decision-making is an extremely diffi-
cult task and could result in important Members being driven out of the
system, if the sacred consensus principle were to be replaced by some
form of majority voting. Sovereignty concerns similar to those that are
currently voiced against allegedly overreaching dispute settlement would
ultimately be raised against undesired outcomes of voting procedures as
they would eventually force results upon countries which the latter can-
not or do not want to accept.
For the time being, only incremental steps by a variety of actors therefore
seem to be feasible and desirable to remedy the situation:
•M embers should assume their systemic responsibility by exercising re-
straint in bringing politically difficult cases to adjudication.
• Adjudicating bodies should continue their current approach to dispute
settlement, based on judicial restraint and the avoidance of “sweeping
statements”.
• Selective multilateral political elements could be built into the dispute
settlement procedure without altering the basic architecture of the
DSU (e.g. by allowing the DSB to decide by consensus not to adopt
specific findings or the basic rationale behind a finding in a report.).
•M embers should explore alternative political decision-making mech-
anisms more actively. Indeed, the WTO Community has become aware
of the problem as the recent report by a “Consultative Group” to the
Director General shows.The report has a clear focus on institutional
issues,including on decision-making.
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Whereas such a gradual and eclectic approach may not satisfy the more
ambitious observers who would favour clear reforms in either direction –
i.e. towards more adjudication and rule-orientation or back to power-ori-
entation and diplomacy – this eclecticism appears at least as a feasible op-
tion.And, if judged in the light of past experience with the gradual evolu-
tion of the system, it also appears to be the most promising approach:The
current DSU is the fruit of five decades of gradual development, which
was not even free of setbacks. There is no reason to assume why such
gradualism should not be adequate for the future as well. If Members and
adjudicating bodies continue to assume their responsibilities for the sys-
tem, the DSU should continue to remain an attractive forum for dispute
settlement.
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